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Abstract
Investigation into the reality of time can be pursued within the ontological domain or it can
also span human thought and natural language. I propose to approach time by correlating
three domains of inquiry: metaphysical time (M), the human concept of time (E), and
temporal reference in natural language (L), entertaining the possibility of what I call a
‘horizontal reduction’ (L > E >M) and ‘vertical reduction’. I present a view of temporalityL/E
as epistemicmodality, drawing on evidence from the L domain and its correlates in the E and
M domains. On this view, the human concept of time is a complex, ‘molecular’ concept and
can be broken down into primitive concepts that are modal in nature, featuring as degrees of
epistemic commitment to representations of states of affairs. I present evidence from tensed
and tenseless languages (endorsing the L > E path) and point out its compatibility with the
view of real time as metaphysical modality (endorsing the E >M path).
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Temporal reference . Reductionism .Modal reduction . Default Semantics . Tenseless
languages
Abbreviations
timeM Real time/metaphysical time
timeE Human concept of time
timeL Time in language
1 The Questions
‘Yes, I love life. Why?’
‘But you’ve made up your mind to shoot yourself.’
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‘What about it? Why put the two together? Life’s one thing, and that’s another.
Life exists, but death doesn’t exist at all.’
‘Do you believe in a future everlasting life?’
No, not in a future everlasting but in an everlasting life here. There are moments,
you reach moments, and time comes to a sudden stop, and it will become
eternal.’
‘You hope to reach such a moment?’
‘Yes.’
‘That’s hardly possible in our time,’ Stavrogin said, also without the slightest
irony, slowly and as though pensively. ‘In the Revelation the angel swears that
there will be no more time.’
‘I know. That’s very true. Clear and precise. When all mankind achieves happi-
ness, there will be no more time, for there won’t be any need for it. A very true
thought.’
‘Where will it be hidden?’
It will not be hidden anywhere. Time is not an object, but an idea. It will be
extinguished in the mind.’
‘Old philosophic clichés, the same from the beginning of time,’ Stavrogin
muttered with an expression of mingled pity and contempt.
‘The same! The same from the beginning of time and never any others!’ Kirillov
cried with glittering eyes, as though that idea contained a triumphant proof of all
he stood for.
Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Devils, 1971, London: Penguin Books, pp. 242-243
Can we conceive of reality without time? The dialogue from Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s The
Devils gives an interesting insight: time as an idea that can be ‘extinguished in the mind’.
Questions about the nature of time and its role in human life are ubiquitous in fiction and
show that although we live in time, we still do not comprehend the human concept of
time and what it is in reality that this concept reflects or addresses. Philosophical research
does not fare much better: ongoing debates concerning the (un)reality of time demon-
strate that we still strive for an answer to such a fundamental question as whether reality is
tensed – that is, whether the present, the past and the future (or at least some of these)
exist, or rather they are just the way humans conceptualize the absolute and relative
ordering of events. In other words, the metaphysics of time is still open to debate, and so
is the nature of the concept of time and the relation, if any, between the two.
Some philosophers of time believe that metaphysical time (or, what philosophers
standardly call the ontology of time) ought to be pursued only through an inquiry into
the physical world; others assume the relevance of an inquiry into the human mind and
the linguistic expression of the human concept of time. In what follows I propose to
adopt the assumption of commensurability of the three domains with respect to time:
metaphysical, epistemological, and linguistic. I present a sketch of a proposal on which
the three domains inform one another to answer their respective, domain-specific
questions concerning temporality. The outcome is what I call a ‘double reduction’
account that testifies to the compatibility of time discourse in all three domains.
I distinguish three meanings of tense: metaphysical tense, in the sense in which
philosophers use it when they ask whether reality is ‘tensed’ (tenseM); epistemological
tense, in the sense that our thoughts distinguish between the past, the present and the future
1856 –Philosophia (2020) 48:1855 1879
(tenseE); and linguistic tense, meaning systematic grammatical marking, normally on the
verb, of temporal reference in a natural language (tenseL). Analogously, I distinguish
between metaphysical time (timeM), where the pertinent questions are whether time itself
is real and what its nature is; the human concept of time (timeE); and linguistic time, that is
time as it is conveyed through natural language devices (timeL).We have to remember here
that tenseL is not a reliable guide to tenseE: not all languages are tensed and in languages
that are tensed, there are tense-time mismatches as well as constructions without tense
markingwhere temporality is conveyed by other, lexical or pragmatic, means. For the same
reason, timeL need not correlate with tenseL. I also occasionally employ the indices M, E
and L in other labels, for example ‘passage of timeE’, ‘futureL’, or ‘modalityM’.
I begin with the focus on timeE and discuss it along two dimensions: one, that I call
‘horizontal’, is the relation between the M, E and L domains. Here I look at the
expression of time in natural language (timeL) in order to gain some insight from
linguistic semantics and pragmatics into the concept that is being expressed. The
variety of means that languages utilise for temporal reference seems to demonstrate
that different aspects of this concept are foregrounded. This is because, as I argued
elsewhere in my proposal of temporality as supervenient on epistemic modality
(Jaszczolt 2009, 2013, 2017, 2018 i.a.), timeE is not a primitive concept but rather is
reducible to component concepts that are themselves not temporal. Put differently, on
the level of conceptual building blocks, what there is, is a degree of detachment with
which we are committed to beliefs, and with which we entertain propositions, about past,
present or future eventualities. This leads to the second, so-called ‘vertical’ dimension, on
which I distinguish the level of the building blocks and the level of their composition. For
example, for the E domain, this amounts to the level of basic, atomic, primitive modalE
concepts and the level of complex, molecular temporalE concepts respectively. TimeMwill
figure in our discussion in two ways: (i) in the attempted sketch of a ‘vertical’ reduction of
temporality within the domains L, E and M and (ii) in their respective ‘horizontal’
mapping: from expressions to thoughts (L to E), and from thoughts to reality (E to M).
I will sketch how the proposed reductionism about timeE strongly suggests reductionism
about timeM – in agreement with modern scientific theories of space and time. Assuming,
as we have, that evidence from natural language can give us insights into conceptualiza-
tion, I will reach the conclusion that temporal reference is not fundamental to our thinking
about reality; what is fundamental is rather the confidence, in the sense of epistemic
commitment, with which we can comprehend states and events. As such the human
concept of time is compatible with the predominant ‘no flow’ view1 as well as with the,
less commonly propounded, symmetric perspective on timeM (Price 1996).
The structure of the paper is as follows. I begin Section 2 by juxtaposing timeM and timeE
and briefly assessing the relevance of some philosophical views on timeM, settling on the so-
called B-theory of time. I then move to the question of timeE in Section 3 and briefly
summarise pertinent aspects of my reductionist account of temporality as modality that I
have been developing for the past decade or so, pointing out some questions that are still left
to be addressed. In Section 4 I move to timeL and new aspects of my reductionist picture. I
1 I do not address the questions of time flow or the experience of the time flow in this paper in that it is an
extensive topic in its own right. The literature here is vast. See e.g. Mozersky 2013, 2015; Price 2011; Prosser
2012, 2013, 2016; Torrengo 2017a, 2017b, 2018; Skow 2015; Deasy 2017; Tallant 2019, to name a few
participants in this lively debate.
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discuss a variety of means languages employ for temporal reference and assess their
significance as evidence for the reductionist account. I focus here on the cases where timeL
is not straightforwardly rendered by tenseL, as in tenseless languages or languages with
unusual tense distinctions, in this context also discussing briefly the role of aspect, mood and
evidentiality in conveying timeL. I correlate timeM with timeE, and subsequently timeE with
timeM, arriving at a doubly reductionist model: the ‘horizontal’ L>E>M reduction and at
the same time the ‘vertical’ timeL/E/M >modalityL/E/M reduction. I conclude by stating the
significance of the demise of the (primitive) concept of time, as well as (primitive) timeL/E/M
altogether, inherent in this reductionism, foregrounding their modalL/E/M underpinnings that
demonstrate that the human perspective, the human concept of time, can justifiably be
viewed as a ‘human imprint’, so to speak, of ‘real time’: at the level of conceptual building
blocks, metaphysical time and human time are perfectly commensurate.
2 Real Time and the Concept of Time
The question about the nature of time has always been intrinsically connected with the
question as to whether time is real. ‘What is time?’ presupposes that there is time, so we
can either accept the presupposition as part of the common ground in the form of scientific
theories of space-time, on the grounds of the conviction that time exists because we
experience it, or on any other grounds whatsoever, as we normally do with theoretical
assumptions that appear plausible. Now, curiously, current discussions on the topic are still
couched in McTaggart’s (1908) distinction between what he called A-series and B-series
of time, despite the fact that the distinction led him to the conclusion that time must be
unreal. On what later became the A-theory, timeM passes and reality is tensedM. In other
words, the distinctions between the pastM, the presentM and the futureM are part of the
metaphysics of time and the presentM has a privileged status fromwhich, or with respect to
which, temporal distinctions are made. On its currently upheld versions, either only what
is in the presentM is real (presentism), or what is in the presentM and the pastM is real (the
growing block view, pastism), or what is in the presentM, the pastM, and the futureM (the
moving spotlight view, permanentism). On B-theory, time does not flow; reality is
tenselessM and timeM consists of relations of precedence and following among events.
This theory is closer to the picture of the universe given to us by contemporary physics in
that the time dimension is very much like space dimensions and is best represented by the
block universe theory. We will leave McTaggart’s well-rehearsed arguments for the
unreality of time aside and merely point out the fact that, more than a hundred years on,
and with significant advances in the field of astrophysics, philosophers are still divided
between A- and B-theory supporters, with both camps running strong.2 It is impossible to
2 See e.g. Prior (1967, 1968, 2003); Tallant 2007, 2013, 2019; Tallant and Ingram 2012; Smith 1993, 2002;
Ludlow 1999, 2013; Bourne 2006; Tooley 1997, 1999; Parsons 2002, 2003; Deasy 2017; and Baron 2017 for
a defense of various versions of A-theory. For arguments in favour of the B-theoretic outlook see e.g.
Oaklander and White 2007; Le Poidevin 2007, 2011; Mellor 1998; Prosser 2012, 2013, 2016; Price 1996,
2011; Rasmussen 2012; Mozersky 2001, 2013, 2015; Torrengo 2014, 2017a, 2017b, 2018. It is not my
intention here to give justice to all extant theories within the A and B orientations. For presentism, see e.g.
Prior 1967, 1968, 2003; Bourne 2006. For growing block view see e.g. Tooley 1997. For moving spotlight
views see Broad 1938 and e.g. Cameron 2015. For an excellent defence of the block universe view see Skow
2015.
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address here even a small part of the arguments but the main reason for the buoyancy of
the time wars seems to be the fact that the scientific approach to timeM favours the B-
theoretic outlook of post-Einsteinian physics, while the experience tells us that reality
appears tensedM, just as it did to Aristotle or St Augustine. Even if one can attack A-
theorists’ arguments, one cannot deny the indispensability of A-theoretic thoughts;
indexicality is all-pervasive in our lives.3 So, I am going to exploit this appearance of
the plausibility of tensismM as arrived at from tensismE, asking what status exactly the
past, the present and the future have in our concept of time (timeE). Having summarised
my theory of temporalityE/L as modalityE/L, I then conclude with a proposal of a novel
modal reduction across (‘horizontal’), as well aswithin (‘vertical’), all three domains: L, E
and M.
3 The Demise of TimeE: The Background
In asking about the nature of the human concept of time, the question about the
complexity of the concept seems the obvious place to start. Is timeE a primitive
concept? Or are there underlying concepts that are not themselves temporal and on
which it supervenes? In this section I present a brief summary of the theory of timeE
(and derivatively timeL, where the ‘L’ domain comes first in the order of explanation) as
modalityE (and derivatively modalityL, respectively) that will be necessary for the
understanding of the new arguments in this paper.
I begin with the precis of my reductionist picture, inspired by cross-cultural linguis-
tic evidence, that is already in place. My essentially phenomenological theory of
temporalityL/E as modalityL/E (Jaszczolt 2009, 2013, 2016a) turns out a positive answer
to the above question: timeE can be broken down into basic conceptual components that
are modal in nature. The proposal is that, arguably, timeE is itself epistemic modality:
our memories, experiences and anticipations relate the holder of the thought to even-
tualities in a way that allows for degrees of commitment. We can remember events
more, or less, faithfully (and be aware of this fact); we can be more, or less, committed
to believing situations that hold at present – for example, due to the differences in the
reliability of sources of evidence that can be expressed by modal expressions and
evidentials; and we can be more, or less, committed to what we anticipate is going to be
the case. I argued that the fact that various linguistic expressions pertaining to the
pastL-, presentL- and futureL-time reference capture this cline of epistemic commitment
testifies to its conceptual significance. For example, to mark different degrees of
commitment to the truth of statements about the past I can use simple past (‘I read
War and Peace last year’), past of narration (‘This is what happened yesterday: I sit in
my room reading War and Peace…’), epistemic necessity past (‘I would/must have
been reading War and Peace then’), or epistemic possibility past (‘I may/might have
been readingWar and Peace then’). Such progressing detachment can also be found in
the domain of present- and future-time reference in English. My proposal was to
account for this modal underpinning of temporality, which I defend as modal
3 See e.g. Perry 1979 and Ismael 2016. On abduction in Prior’s (1959) ‘Thank goodness that’s over’ argument
see La Vine 2016.
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supervenience, by means of utilising an amended version of Grice’s (2001) acceptabil-
ity operator. I adapted his sentential operator Acc ⊦ p (‘It is acceptable that it is the case
that p’) to fit the meaning representations within the theory of Default Semantics (DS,
Jaszczolt 2005, 2010), most notably making it operate not on sentences or propositions
pertaining to sentences but on conceptual representations of the primary meaning of
utterances called merger representations (Σ). Allowing ACC to operate on merger
representations makes this theory more successful in attaining psychological reality
than other extant semantics of temporal reference in that merger representations are not
restricted by the form of the corresponding sentence. As such, they can cater for tense-
time mismatches, sentences without overt markings of temporal reference, and even
primary messages that are conveyed indirectly, in that they model the main message
conveyed by the utterance of the given sentence, even when it is conveyed by an
indirect speech act.4 I also added the index Δ standing for the degree of acceptance, in
order to capture the degrees of epistemic commitment discussed above. The degree can
pertain for example to that conveyed by the ‘regular past’ (‘rp’). We obtain ACCΔrp ⊦ Σ
which reads ‘it is acceptable to the degree Δ pertaining to the regular past that it is the
case that Σ’.5
The entire discourse condition (the formal representation in DS6) is then encased in
square brackets that stand for the scope of the operation of a certain interpretive process
that contributes the temporal reference to the overall interpretation. In this case,
temporal reference is provided by the grammatical tense, so the process is the combi-
nation of word meaning and sentence structure (WS – one of the four processes
identified in DS that produce, compositionally, the primary meaning). In the case of
the past of narration (‘vivid present’), this information will come from WS when the
temporal adverbial is present (‘yesterday’) and from conscious pragmatic inference
(CPI) when it has to be inferred from the broadly understood context. An example of a
merger representation for (1) is given in Fig. 1.
1. I read War and Peace last year.
The modal supervenience view shows that the concept of time may be, so to speak,
‘atemporal’ in its essence, or at least may not rely as much on the distinctions between
the present, the past and the future, or on the perception of the flow of time as the
4 The relevant proposition here is akin to Soames’ (2014a, 2014b, 2019) concept of a cognitive proposition – a
proposition as a type of cognitive act.
5 A potential objection here is that ‘rp’ is itself a temporal concept and yet it figures in the explanans of
temporal reference. However, it figures there only as a label for which a numerical value has to be substituted.
Such numerical values are obtainable empirically through the analysis of the use of relevant temporal
expressions and grammatical forms in discourse. Pertinent methods here are the analysis of corpus data or
neuroimaging. See also Section 4.2.1.
6 Discourse referents (e.g. x, y, t) and discourse conditions are theoretical constructs adopted from Discourse
Representation Theory (Kamp and Reyle 1993) and amended to fit the pragmatic slant of DS. Most
importantly, representations in DS are not semantic representations formed on the basis of the grammatical
form of the sentence but semantic (in the contextualist sense) representations that capture the intended primary
meanings that are conveyed using a variety of linguistic and non-linguistic means and recovered through
corresponding processes. Such representations (merger representations, Σs) are compositional by methodo-
logical assumption. See Jaszczolt 2005, 2010, 2016b.
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common parlance and the common experience (represented in complex concepts) would
signal. As such, it is compatible with the B-theory and so with theories of timeM
advanced in modern physics. Since the pastE and the futureE are underlyingly symmetric
(qua modal concepts, displaying degrees of epistemic commitment), the view is also
broadly compatible with the symmetric view of timeM – or what Price (1996) calls the
view from ‘nowhen’, founded on the results of his scrutiny of symmetry in different
metaphysical domains. As Price (1996: 84) says, “Nothing in physics tells us that one
end of the universe is objectively the start and the other end objectively the finish”. Even
though the anthropocentric perspective has to be adopted to explain our timeE, and often
has been adopted in physics as well for timeM, the essential symmetry of the laws of
physics and the underlying symmetry of the human concept of time (qua degrees of
commitment departing in either direction from the nominal highest value of the eviden-
tially strong, say, experienced and cognized, idealized ‘here and now’), may prove to be
more than a coincidence. I return to this question in more detail in Section 4.2.2.
Now, if we accept the thesis of modal supervenience (in brief, the thesis that
propositions cannot differ with respect to temporal reference without also differing
with respect to modal properties), we are committed to saying that modal differences
throw up the basic temporal differences between the pastL/E, the presentL/E and the
futureL/E. And this is independent from the question as to whether a given natural
language marks such differences in the grammar because temporal reference can be
conveyed not only by tenseL but also by temporal adverbials, aspect, modal expres-
sions, or can even be left to pragmatic inference-a fact that I call elsewhere the ‘lexicon-
grammar-pragmatics trade-off’ (Jaszczolt 2012). To account for this trade-off, mapping
quantitative differences captured by Δ (see Fig. 1) onto qualitative distinctions into
pastE, presentE and futureE is explained in the radically contextualist framework of DS
by invoking the processes of utterance interpretation identified there. To repeat, past of
narration, exemplified in (2), obtains its past-time reference not from the grammatical
form of the verb (i.e., through WS) but from conscious pragmatic inference (CPI).7
2. This is what happened to me yesterday: I go to the station, buy a ticket, get on a
train, and this guy comes to me and says…
7 See e.g. Jaszczolt (2009: 163).
x y t Σ'
[Kasia]WS (x)
[War and Peace]SCWD (y)
last year (t)
[ACC rp WS
[x read y]WS
Σ
Fig. 1 Merger representation for ‘I read War and Peace last year’
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This is the essence of what I called elsewhere the Modal-Contextualist View (MC,
Jaszczolt 2013, 2016a). This completes the precis of my modal reductionist theoretical
background. At this point the current inquiry fits in. Instead of being content with a
theory of timeL/E, one can push further, on the assumption adopted earlier that an inquiry
into timeL/E is relevant for an inquiry into timeM. One can attempt to vindicate B-theory
of timeM on the grounds of compatibility with timeE so understood. To do this, we would
need evidence that conceptualization draws on timeM, or at least an argument that it is
more plausible to assume their compatibility than its lack. If timeE is underlyingly not
tensedE, then time as dimensions of space-time (Hawking 1988, 2001) can be seen as the
springboard for the human concept of time (see Section 4.2.2). In a nutshell, we have
attitudes to reality, imposing the indexical, de se perspective on it.8 At the level of basic
concepts, this is all there is. And, arguably, these basic concepts are crucial for theorizing
because this is where conceptual and (a fortiori for DS) semantic universals can be
found.We can then attempt a modal reduction in all three domains.9 For this purpose we
start with timeL to see how languages execute temporal reference, in pursuit of the
justification for, ultimately, tenselessM reality through tenselessE concepts (at the level of
conceptual building blocks) reflected in tensedL, optionally tensedL or tenselessL lan-
guages. If this enterprise succeeds, we can arguably demonstrate the plausibility of
modal reduction in each of the three domains L, E and M through progressing from L to
E and, here more cautiously and speculatively, from E to M.
4 From TimeL through TimeE to TimeM: A Doubly-Reductionist View
If one accepts the methodological assumption that linguistic expressions give us a
reasonable guide to human concepts used in online thinking but a poor guide to the
universal primitive building blocks of these, where the latter are adopted from neo-
Whorfianism (Levinson 2003), then any inquiry into how languages express temporal
reference will have to be supplemented with research into the building blocks of such
lexicalised or grammaticalised concepts. In addition, it will have to be supplemented
with an inquiry into pragmatic, discoursal means of conveying temporality, where these
means rely either on default interpretations or on pragmatic inference, as is advocated
in the lexicon-grammar-pragmatics trade-offs introduced in Section 3. In what follows,
I present some interesting solutions languages employ for expressing temporal refer-
ence and point out the relevance of such data for the proposed double reductionism,
always bearing in mind the ubiquity of pragmatic means of communication. Having
assessed the feasibility of the ‘timeL to timeE’ inferential path, as well as the modal
reductionism in both domains, and having entertained the possibility of the correlates
for the L-E mapping, I then speculate briefly about the feasibility of an analogous
8 See fn 3, and especially Ismael’s (2016) excellent attempt at reconciling the view of human freedom of
action with the laws governing physical world. Ismael argues that the emergence of self-governing complex
systems, and as such also ego, is compatible with the description of reality on the level of particles given by
modern physics.
9 See e.g. Levinson (2003: 300) on neo-Whorfianism: lexical meanings often correspond to ‘molecular’
concepts and these differ from language to language. But although we normally use molecular concepts in
thinking, they can be broken down into primitive concepts in a reflective process. Arguably, such primitive
concepts are good candidates for semantic universals.
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reduction in the M domain, the cross-domain mapping between E and M, and the
nature of the M-correlates.
4.1 TimeL and TenseL: What Languages Reveal and Hide
A language is tensed when it contains grammaticalised expressions that stand for
temporal reference. These have to be absolute rather than relative, that is the coding
time has to constitute the deictic centre (see Bohnemeyer 2002: 12–13; Tonhauser
2011: 258). English is a tensed language. On the other hand, languages such as Yukatek
Maya, Mandarin Chinese, Paraguayan Guaraní, Burmese, Dyirbal, Kalaallisut (West-
Greenlandic), or Hopi are tenseless. In addition, these languages vary with respect to
the number and types of other temporal devices such as relative tenses, utilisation of
aspect and mood, or temporal adverbials. Yukatek Maya has preverbal aspect-mood
markers that convey information about aspect (terminative, progressive, prospective),
mood (a six-way distinction, including e.g. necessitive (‘I need/needed/will need to
read the paper.’) and desiderative (‘I want/wanted/will want to read the paper.’)) and
temporal distance (proximate relative future, immediate past, recent past, and remote
past). In addition, verbs are obligatorily inflected for the perfective or imperfective
viewpoint aspect. All these are temporally relative markers: for example, prospective
works as in example (3).
3. Mukah in xok-∅ le periyòodiko-o’.
PROSP.3SG 1SG read(SUBJ)(3SG) DEF newspaper.10
‘I am/was/will be going to read the paper.’
(adapted from Bohnemeyer 2002: 5). What is of most interest to us is the expres-
sions of temporal distance. These make up the array of distinctions exemplified in (4).
4. Proximate future:
Ta’itak in xok-ik le periyòodiko-o’.
PROX 1SG read-INC(3SG) DEF newspaper.11
‘I have/had/will have almost read the paper.’
Immediate past:
Táant in xok-ik le periyòodiko-o’.
IMM 1SG read-INC(3SG) DEF newspaper.
‘I have/had/will have just read the paper.’
Recent past:
Sáam in xok-∅ le periyòodiko-o’.
REC 1SG read(SUBJ)(3SG) DEF newspaper.
‘I read/had read/will have read the paper a while ago.’
Remote past:
10 ‘PROSP’ stands for the prospective aspect-mood marker; ‘3SG’ for third person singular; ‘SUBJ’ for
subjunctive verb form, and ‘DEF’ for definiteness marker. Only the relevant grammatical information is
provided.
11 ‘PROX’, ‘IMM’, ‘REC’, and ‘REM’ stand for aspect-mood markers: proximate, immediate, recent and
remote; ‘INC’ for the marker of incompletive status, and ‘1SG’ for first person singular.
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Úuch in xok-∅ le periyòodiko-o’.
REM 1SG read(SUBJ)(3SG) DEF newspaper.
‘I read/had read/will have read the paper a long time ago.’
(adapted from Bohnemeyer 2002: 9). It is clear from this juxtaposition that what is
foregrounded through the grammaticalised distinctions is the degree of remoteness,
while the temporal distinctions are not marked. As Bohnemeyer observes, the overall
effect is not unlike that of relative tenses but since the temporal reference is cancellable,
the markers cannot be classified as tense markers. In addition, Yukatek Maya has very
scarce expressions of temporal ordering such as ‘after’ or ‘while’, leaving such
temporal relations to pragmatic inference (or pragmatic defaults). Using our terminol-
ogy, it can be said that Yukatek Maya is not only tenselessL but has very little overt
timeL marking; temporal adverbials exist but are not obligatory.
Paraguayan Guaraní uses only temporal adverbials and context to mark temporal
reference. Aspect, modality and mood, however, can be grammatically marked. When
they are not, the default interpretation ensues where the temporality of the event, state,
or process overlaps with that of the reference time (Tonhauser 2011). Mandarin is
another example of a language with no morphological tenses. It makes use of temporal
adverbs, modal verbs, aspectual particles, and viewpoint aspect that in combination
with pragmatic means convey temporality. The pragmatic means include the recogni-
tion of defaults such as the present time associated with imperfective viewpoint aspect
and past time with the perfective, where there are no overt aspectual markers in the
sentence, as in (5a) and (5b) respectively.
5. (a) Zhangsan hen mang
Zhangsan very busy.
‘Zhangsan is very busy.’
(b) Zhangsan dapuo yi-ge huaping.
Zhangsan break one-CL vase.12
‘Zhangsan broke a vase.’
(adapted from Lin 2005: 3). In the same vein, West Greenlandic (Kalaallisut), an
Eskimo language, is currently considered to be tenseless. What appear to be markers of
temporal reference are in fact mood markers combined with aspect. For example, the
present- or past-time reference is conveyed through the factual moods (of introducing,
presupposing or enquiring about facts) with further disambiguation provided by aspect
and the context (see Bittner 2005). The future is rendered by prospective markers such
as statives (‘be likely’), inchoatives (‘begin’) and by prospective mood such as the
imperative (‘let us’). The combination of aspect, mood and context is also used for
temporal reference in a tenseless language Hausa (Chadic, Afro-Asiatic). For example,
sentences (6) and (7) are marked only for aspect and can be interpreted with different
temporal reference assigned to them.
6. Ta-nāˋ wā sā
3SgF-CONT play.
‘She is/was/will be playing.’
12 ‘CL’ stands for classifier.
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7. Sun gyārà mōtā sà
3Pl-COMPL repair car.his.
‘They (have/will have) repaired his car.’13
(adapted fromMucha 2013: 381). Pragmatic inference and defaults are said to play a
significant role in establishing the hierarchy of available interpretations. Sentences with
continuous aspect are by default interpreted as having present-time reference and
sentences with completive aspect as referring to the past. There also appears to be a
more general ‘hierarchy of simplicity’ (see Mucha 2013: 392) where the present-time
reference is preferred to the past because the first involves no displacement, while the
past is preferred to the future because the latter involves not only temporal displacement
but also modal displacement. All these, of course, can be overridden by an explicit
lexical marking of temporal reference. The compatibility with the modal reductionism
thesis summarised in Section 3 is evident here. Relying on the pragmatic default for
degrees and types of displacement seems to signal that the modal component of
temporality is crucial for its understanding – an idea that underlies my modal
supervenience thesis, the adoption of modal basic concepts and the formalization in
the modal operator of acceptability.
Acceptability can surface in yet another way in natural languages, as obligatory
evidentials. Matses, a Panoan language from the Amazon region of Peru and Brazil,
obligatorily specifies the source of evidence for past events. It employs what Fleck
(2007) calls double tense: it specifies how long ago the event took place, combined
with an evidential, as well as how long ago the speaker learned about the event,
combined with an evidential. So, we obtain combinations as in (8), juxtaposing distant
past inferential (DIST.PAST.INF) with recent past experiential (REC.PAST.EXP).
8. mayu-n biste-wa-nidak-o-ş.
non.Matses.Indian-ERG hut-make-DIST.PAST.INF-REC.PAST.EXP-3.14
‘Non-Matses Indians (had) made a hut.’
(adapted from Fleck 2007: 590). The juxtaposition pertains to the situation where the
Indians apparently made a hut a long time ago but the speaker discovered it a short time
ago.
It is important to remember that the lexicon-grammar-pragmatics trade-offs come
with different roles attributable to each of the three components in different, including
tenseless, languages. For example, while Guaraní (and St’át’imcets discussed below)
impose some semantic restrictions on the reference time, Hausa appears to resort
entirely to pragmatics (see Mucha 2013: 388). The language-specific values in this
trade-off then give rise to various hypotheses concerning the presence or absence of
grammatical tense when the latter is understood as a highly intra-theoretic concept that
can be realised by phonologically null elements. To quote Matthewson (2006: 705), “In
a linguistic theory which accepts the existence of phonologically null elements, there is
in principle nothing which could prevent tense morphology from being covert.” It is
worth devoting some attention to the grammar/pragmatics interface here in order to
embrace the complexity of the relevant evidence.
13 ‘CONT’ stands for continuous aspect and ‘COMPL’ for completive; ‘F’ stands for feminine gender.
14 ‘ERG’ stands for ergative.
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St’át’imcets, or Lilloet Salish, spoken in southern British Columbia, a language
investigated by Matthewson, has no overt tenses but it seems to have a semantic
restriction to non-future reference time. For example, (9) can obtain past- or present-
reference time but in order to refer to the future, one has to add a marker such as the
clitic kelh in (10).
9. táyt-kan
hungry-1SG.SUBJ.15
‘I was/am hungry.’
10. táyt-kan kelh
hungry-1SG.SUBJ kelh.
‘I will be hungry.’
(adapted fromMatthewson 2006: 676, 678). The marker kelh is analysed as standing
for ‘will’ or ‘would’16 and, on Matthewson’s contentious account, combines with an
invisible – or, to give it a theoretical patina – unarticulated or covert tense morpheme to
render future-time reference. An alternative and less theoretically intrusive option
would be, of course, to relegate the temporal reference to pragmatic inference, just as
it has been done for tenseless languages that have been explicitly argued recently not to
yield to such a covert tense analysis: Yukatek Maya, Guaraní, Mandarin Chinese,
Hausa, and Kalaalliusut.17 On the other hand, since kelh appears to have a clear
meaning of futurity as a future-oriented modal, St’át’imcets has a stronger claim to
being a tensed language than the other languages on our list. This does not mean,
however, that the theory proposed for St’át’imcets generalizes; speculations concerning
the universal status of the semantics of future reference advanced for St’át’imcets have
to be taken with caution. Matthewson (2006: 709) suggests that the future (presumably:
futureL, to account for the semantic universal, rather than futurityE) may be qualitatively
different from the present and the past and as such needs to combine with tenseL. But
this move is by no means mandatory. I have already flagged the importance of the
search for the XM >XE >XL cline of inheritance of characteristics, as well as the reverse
cline in the research thereof (substitute here ‘future’ for ‘X’). In our inquiry into the E
domain, we have found the underlying modality of the human concept of time. So,
while Matthewson’s speculation on a semantic universal to do with futurityL seems to
be on the right track, it appears that it can be obviated by the more general approach of
temporalityE/L as modalityE/L. Not only do we then have the inheritance in the domain
of futurity, but we can deny the ‘special status of the future’ (p. 708); temporality is
underlyingly modal in all three types of temporal reference: the past, the present, and
the future. Where there is no grammatical distinction, the pragmatic universal in the
15 ‘SUBJ’ stands for indicative subject.
16 The significance of the difference can be seen in the pair of examples (i) and (ii):
i. A child was born who will be king.
ii. A child was born who would be king.
adapted from Matthewson (2006: 689, after H. Kamp). In this context, see Abusch’s (1988) proposed
construct WOLL to account for both will and would.
17 See the relevant references earlier in this section.
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form of the lexicon-grammar-pragmatics trade-off kicks in. Moreover, since languages
do not uniformly display the past/nonpast binary distinction à la St’át’imcets but can
also display past/nonpast, or can freely make use of tense/time mismatches, or,
finally, like the tenseless languages discussed above, can have no grammatical
foundations for such distinctions, any speculations concerning the special status of
futurity, as well as a universal application of the covert tense morpheme, appear
rather doubtful.
Yukatek Maya, Paraguayan Guaraní and Mandarin Chinese have been convincingly
shown to be truly tenseless languages. What it means is that there does not seem to be
any external justification for a plausible covert tenseL in the sense of an invisible
category postulated in the syntactic analysis of expressions of the language that would
facilitate the explanation of relevant facts. It is important to remember that from the
functionalist point of view, there is no need for a syntactic hypothesis in the first place.
Using similar argumentation to our lexicon-grammar-pragmatics trade-offs, Tonhauser
(2011: 299) observes that tensed and tenseless languages exhibit equal power and
success in conveying temporality; morphological differences do not make them
different:
“…on this view, Guaraní and English differ only in the inventory of (covert or
overt) expressions that constrain the temporal location of the antecedent reference
time. Crucially, temporal reference in tenseless languages is not un- or under-
determined because of the lack of tense morphemes once the contribution of the
context to temporal reference is properly taken into consideration…”.
Next, the argument in favour of covert tense logically ought to apply also to languages
with optional tense. If there is covert tense that makes a language only superficially
tenseless, then it seems that languages with optional tense markers ought to adopt this
theoretical construct to explain their behaviour. This has been attempted for Washo, an
endangered Native American isolate language spoken on the border of California and
Nevada (Bochnak 2016). Washo has a verbal suffix –uŋil that can appear only in the
context of past-time reference, but marking past-time reference is not obligatory:
sentences without the marker can also successfully convey it, as exemplified in (11)
and (12).
11. há aši
∅-há aš-i.
3-rain-IND.18
‘It is raining/rained/was raining.’
12. há ašuŋili
∅-há aš-uŋil-i.
3-rain-PAST-IND.
‘It rained/was raining.’
(adapted from Bochnak 2016: 249). However, there seems to be no empirical
justification for covert tense. There is nothing theoretically problematic with optional
18 ‘IND’ stands for indicative mood.
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markers of tense; some clauses are tensed, others are tenseless and neither covert tense
nor a tenseless analysis would correctly capture the facts. Mutatis mutandis, the same
goes for languages with fully operational optional tense and aspect such as Thai. Thai
has been argued to conform to the temporality as modality view whereby tenseless
constructions acquire default readings explicable by the scale of epistemic commitment
and as such undergo an analysis in terms of the acceptability operator (see Srioutai
2006; Jaszczolt and Srioutai 2011).
Finally, the inventory of grammatical means of conveying temporality can also
differ. Tensed languages vary not only on the scale of how many distinctions they
grammaticalize but also what type of distinction they make. Swahili has consecutive
tense: where an absolute tense marker (e.g. -li- for the past) is used in the first clause,
the marker-ka- (consecutive tense) is used in subsequent clauses with the meaning of
past but subsequent eventualities (Givón 2005; see also Jaszczolt 2012). The same
marker is used for subsequent future states and events. Northern Paiute, a Uto-Aztecan
language spoken in western United States, has relative tenses. It has been argued that
where English uses subordination with ‘after’ or ‘while’, Northern Paiute uses coordi-
nation between clauses, combined with relative tense, marked for example with a
sequential suffix-si for temporal precedence or -na for simultaneity (see
Toosarvandani 2016). An example is given in (13).
13. Su = naatsi’i tibuni-hu-si, ti = pa’mogo yaa-hu.
NOM= boy wake.up-PFV-SEQ REFL = frog miss-PFV.19
‘After the boy woke up, he missed his frog (i.e. the frog escaped while he was asleep).’
(adapted from Toosarvandani 2016: 867). To compare, in English a sequence of events
can be marked by the sequence of tenses or be left to pragmatic inference, captured for
example by Asher and Lascarides’ (2003) rhetorical structure rule of Narration: where
two sentences (s) refer to events (e), then normally the event referred to in the first
sentence takes place before the event referred to the second sentence, as represented in
(14).
14. s1 < s2⇒ e1 < e2
(14) is one possible way of capturing in a general schema the empirically testable
phenomenon of a pragmatic default.
This brief survey of selected solutions languages employ to expressing temporal
reference reveals a lot about timeE. Firstly, it reveals that temporality is inherently
intertwined with aspectuality, that is the time that is internal to the state or event and as
such permeated with subjectivity: whether we conceptualise an event as extended in
time or punctual, repetitive or single, completed or not, is largely left up for grabs,
depending on how the concept fits in the overall schema, what is considered important
and as such is foregrounded in the mind, and so forth. It is also intertwined with mood
and modality, as well as with evidentiality.20 This interrelation suggests that what is
19 ‘NOM’ stands for nominative; ‘PFV’ for perfective; ‘SEQ’ for sequential suffix; ‘REFL’ for possessive
reflexive pronoun, and ‘=’ marks clitic boundary.
20 This seems to be the case independently of whether one adopts the definition of evidentiality as a (i)
grammatical, or (ii) any, marking of the source of information and as (a) separate, or (b) not, from modality.
For opposing views see e.g. Aikhenvald 2004 and van der Auwera and Plungian 1998. For extensive
references see Aikhenvald 2018.
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foregrounded in the concept of time is its perspectival, indexical character: aspect is a
perspectival, subjective category, so is epistemic modality, and as such they are perfect
candidates to contribute to the externalization of the subjective assessment of time
reference and also, as signalled by aspectual choices speakers make, the subjective
feeling of the passage of time.
All in all, languages grammaticalize or lexicalize different temporal concepts
and distinctions, leaving the remainder of relevant temporal information to
pragmatic inference and default interpretations. The employed trade-offs between
overt and covert means (where by ‘covert’ I mean pragmatic, but sometimes
also, arguably, covert structural à la Matthewson) result in perfect effability of
the speaker’s tensed thought (timeE and within it, tenseE), although what a given
language draws attention to may vary, to wit the obligatory marking of the
source and time of the eventuality as well as of obtaining information about it
in the double tense in Matses discussed above. This diversity of foregrounded
information, combined with unproblematic effability and translatability, signals
that there are universals on which such solutions are built. However, pace
Matthewson, they are not to be found at the level of syntax, as no extant account
of covert tense, no matter how successful in its original sphere of application,
seems to generalize. Instead, they are to be found at the level of concepts that
underlie this variety of foregrounded information and the variety of solutions to
temporal reference. So, it seems that just as neo-Whorfianism proposes concep-
tual building blocks that underlie very different conceptualizations of space and
spatial relations in different languages (Levinson, e.g. Levinson 2003), so we can
discern conceptual building blocks for such diversified solutions to temporal
reference. Different languages just cut the pie in different ways, and while doing
so, give preference to its different components that are likely to be selected
from one conceptual pool. If one pays due attention to lexical, grammatical, as
well as pragmatic means of conveying temporality, this appears to be the natural
conclusion to reach; the onus of proof would have to lie with linguistic
relativists.
4.2 Modal Reduction for the L, E and M Correlates
4.2.1 Correlating TimeL and TimeE
I have argued so far that the theory of temporalityE as modalityE is consistent with
linguistic data and that the perspectival, epistemic-detachment-based view of the
human concept of time is in principle defensible and empirically well supported.
Now, if the modal reduction is to hold in the L and E domains, then the next necessary
step is to decide on the respective correlates that enter into such a mapping. In the L
domain, we make use of the value of the ‘delta index’ on ACC that pertains to a
particular language construction in context, that is a construction as it is interpreted
using the lexicon-grammar-pragmatics trade-off. In other words, we take into account
the meaning in context, allowing for tense-time mismatches, no overt tense markings,
and so forth. In the E domain, we can propose the following. We obtain the value on the
scale from weak belief (or disbelief) to knowledge (or even knowledge on a ‘high-
Philosophia (2020) 48: –1855 1879 1869
stakes scenario’) to capture degrees of epistemic commitment represented by ACCΔ.
21
The method used in establishing this mapping from L to E will have to be empirical. At
present we can only speculate about the general direction to be pursued and it seems
plausible to suggest here (i) the use of large corpora to delimit how the ‘E’ values are
externalised by linguistic expressions (the ‘L’ values), or alternatively (ii) neuroimaging
techniques to correlate the linguistic expression in context of the utterance with the
epistemic value. To be more precise, the value of the ‘delta index’ on ACC will have to
be taken either from (a) the default interpretation of, say, a grammatical tense, or, in
time-tense mismatches, through (b) the lexicon-grammar-pragmatics trade-off, from a
process that leads to conveying particular temporal reference. In (a), the WS process
recognised in DS will suffice because the value is provided by the grammar, while in
(b), the case of tense-time mismatches in English (such as the use of Simple Present for
past events in the past of narration in (2)), in DS the value will be provided by CPI,22 or,
if primed by previous context, by default interpretation called in DS a socio-cultural
and world knowledge default (SCWD). Empirical evidence for the exact mappings is a
topic for a separate extensive inquiry into the fields of corpus linguistics or
neurolinguistics.
In short, the correlates in the E domain will have to be discerned using some external
evidence or an independent argument for their theoretical justification. While the
continuum on the cline from disbelief to knowledge-on-a-high-stakes-scenario can be
assumed as a direct output of the view of temporality as modality, the discrete correlates
have so far been left up for grabs. In Jaszczolt (2009: 150-160), while presenting the L
clines such as that from the simple past/past of narration, through epistemic necessity
and epistemic possibility past, correlated with strong-to-weak commitment respective-
ly, I explicitly left the marking of the relevant values on the scale undetermined,
pointing out that if these can be specified at all, the values would have to be provided
in the course of an extensive empirical study and would correspond to regions rather
than points. It now seems to me that establishing these regions is a task that is more
important than it had seemed then. Correlates and values are crucial if we want to move
forward with the reductionist account.
It also has to be borne in mind that the correlates can be relative to a goal, type of
discourse, or some other regulating factors. For example, practical utility, such as their
role in ethical arguments, is one possible option. At present, the relative freedom in
adopting the assumptions for delineating correlates in the E domain makes the enter-
prise look like, so to speak, a matrix of possible enterprises: if ethical considerations are
at stake, the correlates may be justified by different criteria and by different methods
than, say, correlates that are founded on mere strength of an epistemic attitude. In other
words, before we ‘measure’ the strength of commitment, we may have to establish its
utility.
21 ‘High-stakes scenarios’ is a term used in the philosophical literature on knowledge attribution. The most
widely discussed example is the so-called Bank Case (DeRose 1992; Stanley 2005; Blome-Tillmann 2013;
Lutz 2014): when the stakes are low, for example when a cheque could also be deposited in the bank the day
after, ‘I know the bank will be open tomorrow’ can be judged as said truly. But when stakes are high, for
example when not depositing the cheque would result in an overdraft, missing a deadline, or wasting a cheque,
the same utterance is judged as false.
22 See Figure 1 in Section 3.
1870 Philosophia (2020) 48: –1855 1879
Next, the constitutive role aspectual and modal categories play in timeL strongly
suggests that timeE expressed by them is not only perspectival but also permeated with
attitudes, subjective accounts of actual and possible action, and as such is not a simple
conceptual category but rather an outcome of a bundle of information and thoughts that
make the agent accept an eventuality as a more, or less, accurate depiction of a situation
in the world. Epistemic modality qua attitude to eventualities has been theoretically
represented using alternative, possible, speaker-centered worlds (Kratzer 2012) and one
can here follow Kratzer’s conception in delimiting the correlates. One can employ here
Stalnaker’s (1978) and Lewis’ (1979a, 1979b) centered worlds, or its offshoot, Roberts’
(2015) doxastic centers. Centering possible-world approach would result in a perspec-
tival view that we require for timeL/E: the worlds are theoretical constructs viewed from
the speaker’s (or other deictic centre’s) perspective and they are delimited in some
principled way that results in a deictic, subjectivist picture of reality. The E-correlates
on the scale of modality will then correspond to the ordering of worlds.
This concludes the first leg of the reductionist account: in the order of explanation,
timeL takes us to timeE and both are reducible to modality understood as the semantic
modal underpinnings of temporal reference in the L domain and as the epistemic
concept of acceptability in the E domain respectively. Once we have descended to
the basic level of modal concepts, that is concepts that do not entail temporal reference
or time flow, the second leg of the reduction (E >M) becomes possible. To repeat,
giving a better airing to the time flow in the context of this reductionist model is a
substantial but separate exercise that cannot be ignored. After all, the experience of
moving time cannot be denied and as such has to be explained in the L and E domains.
It is safe to predict that as a corollary of the proposed reduction, it will be inadvertently
exorcised in both domains, paving the way to compatibility with ‘real’, non-flowing
timeM. But the argumentation itself will have to be left for another occasion.
4.2.2 Correlating TimeE and TimeM
Analogously, relating the E and M domains will require a commitment to some
externally justified correlates, although empirical justification for this correlation lies
at present much more in the domain of speculation than that of L and E. In addition, the
search for M correlates clearly falls outside the domain of cognitive science. We can
only sketch a programmatic proposal for this domain, following our method of inquiry
to its natural end, but it has to be remembered that a thorough discussion of this domain
belongs to the philosophy of physics and as such falls outside the scope of this paper.
First, to recap, we have suggested here that the correlation of L and E exhibits not
only parallel modal reductions (our ‘vertical’ reduction: down to the level of basic
modal concepts) but also the reduction of the linguistic to the conceptual (our ‘hori-
zontal’ reduction, from what is expressed to what is thought), in agreement with the
effability guaranteed by the lexicon-grammar-pragmatics trade-offs. Analogously, the E
and M correlation can be hypothesised to exhibit a horizontal reduction and, in
addition, the M domain can be hypothesised to exhibit an analogous vertical reduction.
Let us begin with the first hypothesis: the second leg of the correlations, that is of E
with M, can arguably yield to a ‘horizontal’ reduction (of timeE to timeM). We now
need good arguments in support of such a correlation and ultimately also a reduction.
We can utilise here (i) Hawking’s (1988, 2001) argument of the coordinated direction of
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the three arrows of time and (ii) the anthropic principle in its strong version: we live in a
kind of universe that is correlated with our form of existence. First, Hawking (1988:
145) juxtaposes here three arrows of time: thermodynamic, which stands for the
direction of the increasing entropy (the degree of disorder in the system); psychological
(the direction of the passing timeE); and cosmological (the direction of the expansion of
the universe). He points out that for intelligent life to exist, these directions have to be
commensurate. Just as we need energy in the (ordered) form of mass (food) to
transform it into the (disordered) form (heat), so we live in time that passes from what
is anticipated to what was experienced. And we do so when the universe is expanding.
But the question is how to interpret this linearity and co-directionality. In the domain of
timeE, it may correspond to the degrees of commitment to an event that at the level of
‘conceptual molecules’ (complex concepts) gives rise to the sense of temporal location
and the feeling of the flow or passage. In the domain of timeM, it may be the causal
order of events that gives rise to the feeling that timeE flows.
23 We see the world in a
certain way because we exist in a certain way, as the anthropic principle sums up.
Arguably, if the anthropic constraint could be lifted, the agent could acquire the sense
of relative time: one could vary the speed of movement significantly enough in order to
record the slowing time. ‘Record’ here is significant: in our reality, we can ‘feel’ the
slowing time but we ‘know’ that our time doesn’t really slow down. We have to
reconcile this feeling with what we take to be the objective measurement.24 Or, perhaps,
upon lifting the constraint, the agent could even acquire the sense of symmetrical time
and we could disregard the ‘arrow of time’ altogether: the past and the future could
swap places.25 Or, perhaps at the level of the ultimate units of description of the
universe, time does not even figure at all, as predicted by loop quantum gravity.26
With the above disclaimers in mind, the co-directionality of these three arrows has
some explanatory use for our reduction. It shows the parallelisms in the three domains
regarding their linearity and provides the conceptual matrix for the interpretation of this
linearity. We have now established that linearity qua gradation can be taken as the
underlying fundamental category and, arguably, this can constitute the foundation of
the second leg of our correlations of respective reductions. I do not know what would
constitute proof in this domain other than successfully mapping the values of the ‘delta
index’ on ACC obtained through a quantitative analysis in the domain of timeL onto
degrees of commitment in the domain of timeE and these in turn onto, we speculate, the
values obtained in a quantitative analysis of the expansion of the universe. At this point,
in order to continue with the hypothesis of the E >M reduction, we have to descend to
the level of modality and pursue it on that lower level, namely through the parallelism
of the vertical reductions in the L, E, and, as is to be demonstrated, the M domains.
23 A further supporting argument comes from the denial of presentism: arguably, the presentE, the pastE and
the futureE are intuitively equally real, and so eternalism is intuitively plausible (see Torrengo 2014, 2017b).
24 To repeat, I sketch an account of the subjective feeling of the rate of passage in a separate paper, pointing
out the importance of the awareness of its subjectivity.
25 See Price 1996 and Section 3 above on symmetrical universe and symmetry in the laws of physics.
26 ‘That the gravitational field has quantum properties is a shared conviction, albeit one currently supported
only by theoretical arguments rather than by experimental evidence. The absence of the time variable from the
fundamental equations ... is plausible – but on the form of these equations the debate still rages.’ Rovelli
(2018: 172).
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In Jaszczolt (2018), I tentatively suggested considering metaphysical modality as the
M correlate of epistemic modality: just as we are committed to propositions to a certain
degree on a scale from weakly believing to ‘strong’ knowing, so eventualities can or
must (in the sense of metaphysical modality) take place. Using a procedure analogous
to that in Section 4.2.1, we have now identified the units that are to enter into a
quantitative analysis of such a correlation. In the E domain, they are, to repeat, the
independently motivated units on the scale disbelief – knowledge-on-a-high-stakes
scenario, that is the epistemic correlates of the ‘delta’ values of ACC (obtained from
the mapping from the L domain onto the E domain using one of the empirical research
methods stipulated above). In the M domain, they are metaphysical probability values
that, arguably, are theoretically obtainable. This is a highly speculative construal at
present but, I believe, the overall sketch may be on the right track. Moreover, due to the
fact that the M correlate will, arguably, always have to depend on the chosen assump-
tions and as such will remain a theoretical construct, the practical applications will also
have to be assumption-driven. After all, we correlate here a deictic, subjectivist picture
(timeE) with what in domain M would become striving at omniscience about past,
present and future events, so perhaps we ought to be humbled and satisfied with at least
having a procedure potentially leading to a theoretical model rather than expecting
absolute values. On the other hand, recent advancements in astrophysics that make it
possible to measure the rate of the expansion of the universe may render this cautious
relativism unnecessary.
4.2.3 Summing up: From TimeL through TimeE to TimeM
All in all, we conclude on a tentative note: there is significant evidence, and an
argument has been sketched, for proceeding from timeL to timeE, on the assumption
that the lexicon-grammar-pragmatics trade-offs are recognised in the domain of timeL,
and with the disclaimer that the units and values in the L domain (value of the ‘delta
index’ on ACC) as well as in the E domain (value on the scale from disbelief to
knowledge-on-a-high-stakes-scenario) have to be pursued through an empirical method
yet to be worked out. In the L domain, one can use large corpora or evidence from
neuroimaging. In the case of the E domain, one has to employ assumptions concerning
distinctions within the epistemic scale that can obtain the strongest independent
support. In other words, the continuous gradation of commitment can be broken down
into discrete concepts that are motivated by categorical distinctions between, say,
‘knowing’, ‘believing’ and ‘doubting’ simpliciter, perhaps aided by additional quali-
fiers, or can be externally justified on some grounds other than epistemic, for example
ethical or goal-specific, as tentatively suggested above. Here we can also interpret units
on the disbelief – knowledge-on-a-high-stakes-scenario scale (the E domain) as units
obtained through limiting and centering possible worlds. Open methodological as well
as theoretical questions concerning the correlates, and the relative freedom in adopting
relevant criteria, make the enterprise largely confined to metaphilosophy at present.
Concerning the second leg of the attempted ‘horizontal reduction’, that is E >M, and
at the same time correlating the modal (‘vertical’) reductions in the second leg (timeE to
modalityE and timeM to modalityM), there is some evidence, and an argument has been
sketched, for the plausibility of the reduction of timeE to timeM, on the methodological
(and ontological) assumption of the co-directionality of the time arrows in the
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thermodynamic, psychological and cosmological domains and by stipulating a corre-
lation between epistemic and metaphysical modality. But the best bet at present seems
to be to pursue parallel modal reductionism directly, utilising the correlation between
the epistemic modality (E domain) and the metaphysical (M domain) modality. We
have added a disclaimer here that the selection of the units to be correlated in each
domain makes the enterprise more speculative than that pertaining to the first leg. It
also limits its practical applicability – but, as I argued, perhaps this is the horizon of
what there is to be found out: we are working out the M equivalents of these essentially
E-domain terms, being ourselves essentially E-domain agents.
In short, the value of the current proposal is in the novel, two-dimensional reduc-
tionist model of time and in the associated methodology of a cross-domain inquiry into
time rather than in particular empirical findings. We end up with the schema of the
relevant reductions in Fig. 2. The vertical reduction was presented here as a theory of
modal supervenience, while the horizontal reduction was adopted as a partially sup-
ported methodological (and ontological) assumption about a cline of vertical
correlations.
5 Conclusion: The Significance of the Two-Way Reduction and Some
Loose Ends
I have sketched here a proposal for a reduction of temporal concepts: ‘vertical’ from
temporality to modality, and ‘horizontal’ from timeL to timeE and from timeE to timeM.
In other words, by correlating timeM with timeE, and subsequently timeE with timeM, I
arrived at a doubly-reductionist model: the ‘horizontal’ L > E >M reduction and at the
same time the ‘vertical’ timeL/E/M > modalityL/E/M reduction. By (i) demonstrating the
significance of the demise of the (primitive) concept of time, as well as (primitive)
timeL/E/M altogether, inherent in this reductionism, and (ii) foregrounding their
modalL/E/M underpinnings I have shown that the human perspective, the human concept
of time, can justifiably be viewed as a ‘human imprint’, so to speak, of ‘real time’: at
the level of conceptual building blocks, metaphysical time and human time are
perfectly commensurate.
It has to be borne in mind that while the reductionism captured in Fig. 2 helps
delineate our vast playing field, the main rationale behind this project was more
modest. It was to demonstrate that when we analyse timeL as modal and as such as,
so to speak, ‘time-free’ at the level of its building blocks, there is a direct route to the
level of conceptualisation, that is timeE, and a plausible possibility that further reduc-
tionism to timeM also obtains. To repeat, the unified analysis of the three domains
‘horizontal’ reducon 
(methodological and meL meE meM
(ontological assumpon)
‘vercal’ reducon semanc epistemic metaphysical
(modal supervenience) modality modality modality
Fig. 2 Horizontal and vertical reductions in the timeL/E/M domains
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shows that real time leaves an ‘imprint’ on human time, making the study of time in all
three domains conducive to a unified inquiry and a unified picture.
My modal view is essentially B-theoretic in that it denies the objectivity of the past, the
present and the future. But it is B-theoretic in a very unusual way. The past, the present and
the future are reduced to values of the index on the acceptability in the semantic
representations in the L domain. The correlates in the E-domain are obtained through
the processing of conceptual structures. As such, the latter are partly empirically supported
(if we adopt the assumed correlation between language and thought) by what happens in
the L domain of linguistic externalizations of these concepts. So, arguably, there still is the
present, the past and the future on the molecular level in each domain: L, E, as well as M!
The pastM, the presentM and the futureM become reduced, but do not completely disappear
if we want to adhere to a horizontal reduction that necessitates vertical supervenience in all
three domains. Time is exorcised from all three domains but only on the tier of the building
blocks depicted on the lower cline in Fig. 2. And when it does appear on the upper tier, its
inescapable indexicality brings back the A-theoretic concepts.
Throughout this discussion I have been reverting to a disclaimer in that there is an
obvious, albeit arguably tangential, question that stays at the back of anyone’s mind
while theorizing about time: it is the question of the human experience of the flow of
time. In the model proposed here, modal reductions across all three domains make use
of the interpretation of linearity of time as degrees in measurement and as such
overcome (or bypass) the problem with the experience of the flow of time. But the
feeling of the flow cannot be explained away so easily: both the human experience of
flow with all its vagaries, and the concept of the flow itself, cannot be explained away
by pointing out that they do not occur on the level of conceptual building blocks of my
vertical reduction from temporalityL/E to modalityL/E. More has to be said. The next
step, and a separate project, is to see whether the reductionist account as proposed so far
can be used for the analysis of the meaning and status of this flow.
The defence of tensed reality (tenseM) in philosophical literature seems to be
launched largely from the E-domain vantage point, although versions have been
recently defended that are compatible with our L/E/M convergence and as such also
with timeM as it is represented in current theories of space-time. Baron (2017) conjec-
tures that modern physics could endorse the A-theoretic perspective in that asymmetry
of time could explain physical phenomena. To defend A-theory it suffices to defend the
objective passage, even if only by using empirical evidence of the objectivity of human
experience or a theoretical argument from the utility of asymmetry in physics. Deasy
(2017) entertains the possibility of explaining tensism through modal terms for passage
and indexicalism for the ‘now’ anchoring, for example juxtaposing presentism with
actualism to point out their common pitfalls.27 The first utilises the M-E convergence,
while the latter utilises the modal view of temporality. It is perhaps in a similar spirit
that our ‘tensed but only through supervenience’ view of reality can be taken: in the
spirit of our horizontal and vertical reductions respectively, always remembering that,
should we pursue this line of reasoning, the anthropocentric perspective is assumed in
all domains – albeit for different, better or worse, reasons in each of the three domains.
In a nutshell, on the molecular level of timeL/E/M, the human perspective governs it all:
speaking about time, thinking about time, and the limits of what we take to be real time
27 For criticism see Tallant 2019.
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in that, for humans, the past and the future cannot just swap places and time appears to
be dynamic, with a flow and its direction.28 But at the level to which, as we have
shown, timeL/E/M can be reduced, we have the demise of time in all three domains alike.
There is no flow, direction, or change. And there is no indexicality other than what may
or must happen (modalityM) or may or must be known (modalityE) and said
(modalityL). But deconstructing these is a different reductionist project altogether. We
are still a long way from fully understanding how “[t]ime emerges from a world
without time” (Rovelli 2018: 117) but this exercise in double reductionism offers a
possible harbinger of findings and methods to come – at the very least, it suggests that,
as far as time is concerned, ‘a world’ is best understood at the same time as a physical
world, a private, inner world, and social reality. To adapt Rovelli’s apt motto, “timeM/E/L
emerges from a worldM/E/L without timeM/E/L”.
The doubly-reductionist model proposed here is also incomplete in another way –
and some of this incompleteness is incompleteness by necessity. The incompleteness in
the vertical reduction stems from the fact that while the modal supervenience in the L
and E domains is well supported and evidenced, and falls within the scope of
philosophy of language and linguistic research, reduction in the M domain has to rely
on an argument from parallelism that shows how scientific theories correlate with the
modal supervenience in the other two domains. Metaphysical modality, in the sense of
metaphysical possibility and necessity, is the relevant explanans here. Incompleteness
in the horizontal reduction is even harder to avoid: the reduction relies on the thesis of
the inheritance, or at least correlation, between certain properties in each domain and
the feasibility of discerning M-correlates for values that correspond to the value of the
‘delta index’ on ACC in the L domain. Again, while this has been plausibly worked out
for the L and E domains, the correlates for the M domain have only been tentatively
sketched and will have to remain such in any philosophico-linguistic inquiry.
Acknowledgements Previous versions of this paper were presented at The Centre for the Philosophy of
Time, University of Milan; University of Genoa; Faculty of Philosophy, University of Łódź; Beijing Language
and Culture University; Serious Metaphysics Group, University of Cambridge; and Chronos Colloquium,
University of Neuchâtel. I wish to thank the audiences of these events, as well as Hugh Mellor and Giuliano
Torrengo, for their comments and suggestions.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which
permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and
indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the
article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory
regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
References
Abusch, D. (1988). Sequence of tense, intensionality and scope. In H. Borer (Ed.), Proceedings of the seventh
west coast conference on formal linguistics (pp. 1–14). Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications.
28 On the nature of this dynamism see Torrengo 2018.
1876 Philosophia (2020) 48: –1855 1879
Aikhenvald, A. Y. (2004). Evidentiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Aikhenvald, A. Y. (Ed.). (2018). The Oxford handbook of evidentiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Asher, N., & Lascarides, A. (2003). Logics of conversation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
van der Auwera, J., & Plungian, V. A. (1998). Modality’s semantic map. Linguistic Typology, 2, 79–124.
Baron, S. (2017). Feel the flow. Synthese, 194, 609–630.
Bittner, M. (2005). Future discourse in a tenseless language. Journal of Semantics, 22, 339–387.
Blome-Tillmann, M. (2013). Knowledge and implicatures. Synthese, 190, 4293–4319.
Bochnak, R. (2016). Past time reference in a language with optional tense. Linguistics and Philosophy, 39,
247–294.
Bohnemeyer, J. (2002). The grammar of time reference in Yukatek Maya. München: Lincom Europa.
Bourne, C. (2006). A future for presentism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Broad, C. D. (1938). Examination of McTaggart’s philosophy (Vol. 2, Part 1). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Cameron, R. (2015). The moving spotlight. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Deasy, D. (2017). What is presentism? Noûs, 51, 378–397.
DeRose, K. (1992). Contextualism and knowledge attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,
52, 913–929.
Fleck, D. W. (2007). Evidentiality and double tense in Matses. Language, 83, 589–614.
Givón, T. (2005). Context as other minds: The pragmatics of sociality, cognition and communication.
Amsterdam: J. Benjamins.
Grice, P. (2001). Aspects of reason. Ed. by R. Warner. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hawking, S. W. (1988). A brief history of time: From the big bang to black holes. London: Bantam Press.
Hawking, S. W. (2001). The universe in a nutshell. London: Bantam Press.
Ismael, J. T. (2016). How physics makes us free. New York: Oxford University Press.
Jaszczolt, K. M. (2005). Default semantics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jaszczolt, K. M. (2010). Default semantics. In B. Heine & H. Narrog (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of
linguistic analysis (pp. 193–221). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jaszczolt, K. M. (2009). Representing time: An essay on temporality as modality. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Jaszczolt, K. M. (2012). Cross-linguistic differences in expressing time and universal principles of utterance
interpretation. In L. Filipovic & K. M. Jaszczolt (Eds.) Space and time in languages and cultures:
Linguistics diversity (pp. 95-121). Amsterdam: J. Benjamins.
Jaszczolt, K. M. (2013). Temporality and epistemic commitment: An unresolved question. In K. M. Jaszczolt
& L. de Saussure (Eds.) Time: Language, cognition, and reality (pp. 193-209). Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Jaszczolt, K. M. (2016a). Temporal reference without the concept of time? In B. Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk
(Ed.) Conceptualizations of time (pp. 3-24). Amsterdam: J. Benjamins.
Jaszczolt, K. M. (2016b). Meaning in linguistic interaction: Semantics, metasemantics, philosophy of lan-
guage. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jaszczolt, K. M. (2017). Temporal reference. In A. Barron, Y. Gu & G. Steen (Eds.), The Routledge handbook
of pragmatics (pp. 227-240). London: Routledge.
Jaszczolt, K. M. (2018). Time, perspective and semantic representation. Language and Cognition, 10, 26-55.
Jaszczolt, K. M. & Srioutai, J. (2011). Communicating about the past through modality in English and Thai. In
A. Patard & F. Brisard (Eds.) Cognitive approaches to tense, aspect and epistemic modality (pp. 249-
278). Amsterdam: J. Benjamins.
Kamp, H., & Reyle, U. (1993). From discourse to logic: Introduction to Modeltheoretic semantics of natural
language, formal logic and discourse representation theory. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Kratzer, A. (2012). Modals and conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
La Vine, M. (2016). Prior’s thank-goodness argument reconsidered. Synthese, 193, 3591–3606.
Le Poidevin, R. (2007). The images of time: An essay on temporal representation. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Le Poidevin, R. (2011). The temporal prison. Analysis, 71, 456–465.
Levinson, S. C. (2003). Space in language and cognition: Explorations in cognitive diversity. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Lewis, D. (1979a). Attitudes de dicto and de se. Philosophical Review, 88, 513–543.
Lewis, D. (1979b). Scorekeeping in a language game. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8, 339–359.
Lin, J.-W. (2005). Time in a language without tense: The case of Chinese. Journal of Semantics, 23, 1–53.
Ludlow, P. (1999). Semantics, tense, and time: An essay in the metaphysics of natural language. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Philosophia (2020) 48: –1855 1879 1877
Ludlow, P. (2013). Tensism. In K. M. Jaszczolt & L. de Saussure (Eds.), Time: Language, cognition, and
reality (pp. 175–192). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lutz, M. (2014). The pragmatics of pragmatic encroachment. Synthese, 191, 1717–1740.
Matthewson, L. (2006). Temporal semantics in a superficially tenseless language. Linguistics and Philosophy,
29, 673–713.
McTaggart, J. E. (1908). ‘The unreality of time’.Mind 17. Reprinted in: J. E. McTaggart. 1934. Philosophical
studies. London: E. Arnold. 110–31.
Mellor, D. H. (1998). Real time II. London: Routledge.
Mozersky, M. J. (2001). Smith on times and tokens. Synthese, 129, 405–411.
Mozersky, M. J. (2013). The B-theory on the twentieth century. In H. Dyke & A. Bardon (Eds.), A companion
to the philosophy of time (pp. 167–182). Oxford: Wiley and Sons.
Mozersky, M. J. (2015). Time, language, and ontology: The world from the B-theoretic perspective. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Mucha, A. (2013). Temporal interpretation in Hausa. Linguistics and Philosophy, 36, 371–415.
Oaklander, L. N., & White, V. A. (2007). B-time: A reply to Tallant. Analysis, 67, 332–340.
Parsons, J. (2002). A-theory for B-theorists. The Philosophical Quarterly, 52, 1–20.
Parsons, J. (2003). A-theory for tense logicians. Analysis, 63, 4–6.
Perry, J. (1979). The problem of the essential indexical. Noûs, 13, 3–21.
Price, H. (1996). Time’s arrow and Archimedes’ point: New directions for the physics of time. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Price, H. (2011). The flow of time. In C. Callender (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of time (pp.
276–311). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Prior, A. N. (1959). Thank goodness that’s over. Philosophy, 34, 12–17.
Prior, A. N. (1967). Past, present and future. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Prior, A. N. (1968). Papers on time and tense. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Prior, A. N. (2003). Papers on time and tense (New ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Prosser, S. (2012). Why does time seem to pass? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 85, 92–116.
Prosser, S. (2013). Passage and perception. Noûs, 47, 69–84.
Prosser, S. (2016). Experiencing time. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Rasmussen, J. (2012). Presentists may
say goodbye to A-properties. Analysis, 72, 270–276.
Roberts, C. (2015). Indexicality: de se semantics and pragmatics. Ms, Ohio State University. Draft of April
2015. http://www.ling.ohio-state.edu/~roberts.21/NYU/Roberts.Indexicality.pdf. Accessed 4 Oct 2017.
Rovelli, C. (2018). The order of time. London: Allen Lane. Transl. By E. Segre and S. Carnell. First published
in 2017 as L’ordine del tempo. Milan: Adelphi Edizione SPA.
Skow, B. (2015). Objective becoming. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smith, Q. (1993). Language and time. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smith, Q. (2002). Time and degrees of existence: A theory of “degree presentism”. In C. Callender (Ed.),
Time, reality and experience (pp. 119–136). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Soames, S. (2014a). Cognitive propositions. In J. C. King, S. Soames, & J. Speaks (Eds.), New thinking about
propositions (pp. 91–124). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Soames, S. (2014b). Clarifying and improving the cognitive theory. In J. C. King, S. Soames, & J. Speaks
(Eds.), New thinking about propositions (pp. 226–244). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Soames, S. (2019). Propositions as cognitive acts. Synthese, 196, 1369–1383.
Srioutai, J. (2006). Time conceptualization in Thai with special reference to d1ay1II, kh3oe:y, k1aml3ang, y3u:I
and c1a. PhD thesis. University of Cambridge.
Stalnaker, R. C. (1978). Assertion. Syntax and semantics 9. New York: Academic Press. Reprinted in R. C.
Stalnaker (1999), Context and content: Essays on intentionality in speech and thought (pp. 78-95).
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stanley, J. (2005). Knowledge and practical interests. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tallant, J. (2007). What is B-time? Analysis, 67, 147–156.
Tallant, J. (2013). Time. Analysis, 73, 369–379.
Tallant, J. (2019). Presentism remains. Erkenntnis, 84, 409–435.
Tallant, J., & Ingram, D. (2012). Time for distribution? Analysis, 72, 264–270.
Tonhauser, J. (2011). Temporal reference in Paraguayan Guaraní, a tenseless language. Linguistics and
Philosophy, 34, 257–303.
Tooley, M. (1997). Time, tense, and causation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Tooley, M. (1999). The metaphysics of time. In J. Butterfield (Ed.), The arguments of time (pp. 21–42).
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
1878 Philosophia (2020) 48: –1855 1879
Toosarvandani, M. (2016). The temporal interpretation of clause chaining in northern Paiute. Language, 92,
850–889.
Torrengo, G. (2014). Ostrich presentism. Philosophical Studies, 170, 255–276.
Torrengo, G. (2017a). Feeling the passing of time. Journal of Philosophy, 114, 165–188.
Torrengo, G. (2017b). The myth of presentism’s intuitive appeal. Phenomenology and Mind, 12, 50–55.
Torrengo, G. (2018). Perspectival tenses and dynamic tenses. Erkenntnis, 83, 1045–1061.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.
Philosophia (2020) 48: –1855 1879 1879
